

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CALL OUT THE MINUTEMEN

by

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ABSTRACT

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The term "Minutemen" hearkens back to the American Revolution and those militiamen who, *at a minute's notice*, were armed and prepared to fight the British Regulars. Where are the Minutemen today? I would argue that they no longer exist. Although Reserve Component forces are on the front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, unlike their active duty counterpart, they are not structured, or resourced to respond rapidly in the event of a crisis. Unless the Reserve Components can transform the way they do business and adopt a more expeditionary mindset, it is likely that they will become less and less relevant to the Total Force. Maybe it is time to resurrect the Minuteman system?

The MINUTEMEN concept would create a more rapidly deployable, expeditionary Reserve Component force. This campaign capable force would fill a current void in available manpower while enhancing the capability of the Reserve Components. The concept is based on the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) Concept already used by the Active Component. Under this concept, all Reserve Component units would rotate through pre-planned and tiered, alert and readiness levels over a five year period. Under the MINUTEMEN system, all Reserve Component functions (i.e. training, recruiting, etc.) would be based on the units position in the five year cycle. The MINUTEMAN system would allow the reserves to remain relevant and ready as the Regular Army transforms to adopt an expeditionary force structure and mindset,

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CALL OUT THE MINUTEMEN

Where have all the Minutemen gone? The term "Minutemen" hearkens back to the American Revolution and those militiamen who, *at a minute's notice*, were armed and prepared to fight the British Regulars. "Minutemen were a small, hand-picked elite force which was required to be highly mobile and able to assemble quickly. Minutemen were selected from militia muster rolls by their commanding officers."¹ Where are the Minutemen today? I would argue that they no longer exist. Today, Reserve Component forces are on the front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Unlike their active duty counterpart, they are not structured or resourced to respond rapidly in the event of a crisis. Unless the Reserve Components can transform the way they do business and adopt a more expeditionary mindset, it is likely that they will become less and less relevant to the Total Force. Maybe it is time to resurrect the Minuteman system?

REASONS TO TRANSFORM

In order to fully appreciate the requirement for change in the Reserve Components, it is necessary to view the overall condition of the Army. Anyone who watches the news knows that the Army is stretched to the limit. The Army was authorized more than 700,000 troops at the end of Desert Storm; after the war, the Army's end strength was reduced to 480,000. While the Army's force structure has since remained constant, the operating tempo has increased significantly. In fact, the worldwide requirement for Army forces has increased significantly in just the last three years. For example, in July 2000, the Army had over 140,000 soldiers deployed; today we have over 368,000 soldiers deployed around the world, a 150% increase in mission without a commensurate increase in end strength.²

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom have placed the greatest strains on our Army. In fiscal year 2003, 24 of 33 Active Component Army brigades and 5 of the National Guard's 15 Enhanced Separate brigades were deployed.³ According to the *Army Times*, there were 132,000 troops supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom in November 2003, including some 50,000 Army Reservists and 29,000 Air and Army National Guardsmen.⁴ This spring, eight out of ten active Army divisions will be in transit to or from Iraq and/or Afghanistan. According to a recent article in the *Christian Science Monitor*, the Army recently blocked the reassignment, or retirement of 7,000 Active Duty soldiers in order to meet the requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵ These two deployments have placed extraordinary strains on our nation's Armed Forces.

The Reserve Components have been particularly hard hit by this increased operational tempo. In a recent commentary in the *Washington Post*, Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief of the Army Reserve, stated that "Army Reserve soldiers have been deployed 10 times in the past 12 years for operations from Bosnia to Iraq. During the 75 years before that, the Army Reserve had been mobilized just nine times."⁶ Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, approximately 300,000 reservists have been mobilized, constituting the largest deployment of Reserve Component forces since World War II.⁷

To make matters worse, many soldiers in the Reserve Components have been subjected to short notice mobilizations. These unscheduled mobilizations place extraordinary stress on the Reserve Component soldiers, their families, and their employers. They also force the Army to cut corners by reducing post mobilization training time. The Department of Defense (DoD) goal is to provide 30 days notification prior to mobilization; however, during recent mobilizations, the Army has had great difficulty in meeting this goal. General Helmly's comments in the United States Army Transformation Update clearly articulate this problem. General Helmly specifically cites the decision to dispense with the TPDF (time-phased force deployment) during Operation Iraqi Freedom as placing additional stress on the Reserve Components:

We had soldiers who received less than 48 hours notice, and that's not right... The big issue here is predictability. With an event like September 11, everybody knows and understands that you cannot plan for that kind of unpredictable event... what are not understandable are predictable events like the Iraq operation... We scheduled rotations to the Balkans – Bosnia and Kosovo – a year in advance. And still, I've been unable to notify our soldiers at least 30 days in advance, and have a set of official orders in their hands so they can notify their employers in a timely manner.⁸

What makes this situation more difficult to bear is that the burdens of these mobilizations have not been shared equally among all Reserve Component soldiers. According to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Thomas F. Hall, while 352,000 reservists have been mobilized since September 11th, almost two thirds of the reserve force hasn't been mobilized at all in the past 10 years.⁹ Furthermore, only 4% of the reserves have been mobilized multiple times. The high demand low density specialties, such as military police and civil affairs, have been under exceptional pressure. For example, the Maryland Army National Guard's 115th Military Police Battalion has been called up three times in the past two years.¹⁰ The 401st Civil Affairs Battalion, an Army Reserve unit, has been asked to send 160 soldiers back to Afghanistan and Iraq only 10 months after they returned from one year overseas

mobilizations.¹¹ Under the new 12 month “Boots on the ground” policy in Iraq, approximately 30,000 reservists are having their mobilizations extended to ensure that they have 12 months in Iraq prior to demobilization. For example, the 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, which was scheduled to go home in July has had its return date pushed back three times to March 2004 , nearly 15 months after it was called up.¹²

In addition to the multiple mobilizations noted above, some reserve units were mobilized and then poorly utilized. Some 2,000 reservists spent more than a year on alert status without ever deploying, while other reservists were held on active duty beyond their call-up dates, due to administrative errors.¹³ Still other reservists were mobilized four months before Iraq and then told they weren’t needed.¹⁴ This type of unnecessary disruption causes anxiety and resentment among the soldiers, their families, and their employers. The repercussions of these sentiments are likely to be felt well into the future.

Recruiting and retention are two areas where problems are expected to arise due to the high mobilization rates. In FY03, the Army Reserve fell short of its reenlistment goals. At the same time, the National Guard fell 13% short of its recruiting goal.¹⁵ A recent National Guard survey indicates that long deployments could cause an increased attrition rate, with 20-25% of these soldiers leaving the military per year.¹⁶ The good news is that the recruiting shortfalls in the Guard were offset by higher than average retention rates. The bad news is that some of this increased retention may be due to the recent “stop loss” which keeps soldiers from leaving the service. In fact, many experts believe that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are going to have a harder time recruiting in the future.

“This is our Valley Forge: says Lieutenant General Roger Shultz, director of the Army National Guard. He doesn’t see a mass exodus, but thinks reenlistments will drop”.¹⁷ There are also indications that there will be fewer enlistments from departing active duty soldiers, a traditional source of Reserve Component manpower. One Army sergeant major recently told Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that all the services are having trouble persuading soldiers leaving active duty to join the reserves.¹⁸

There is also a perception that Reserve Component forces are having to pull more than their share of the burdens, with less of the rewards. In a recent *Newsweek* article, a wife of an Army Reservist succinctly captured the perception, held by some families, of unfairness in the treatment of reserve forces in Iraq. “Why are reservists there for 16 months and some active-duty guys for six months?”.¹⁹ In addition to these harmful perceptions, there are other factors that reservists face that active soldiers do not. Many National Guardsmen were placed on active duty after September 11, 2001, to guard airports and military installations. These

National Guard forces, called up under Title 32 authority, are not protected under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. This act suspends some of the civil obligations of soldiers allowing them to concentrate on their mission.²⁰ While the soldiers on State active duty are not deployed overseas, they also make sacrifices and their contribution to national defense are just as critical as those soldiers mobilized under Title 10, or serving on active duty.

In addition to this perception of unequal burden sharing, the Reserve Components face other problems that are unique to citizen soldiers. Usually, they do not live on, or near to military installations. Reserve Component soldiers and their families do not have access to the same level of support and facilities as their active component counterparts. This support is especially critical when the soldiers' mobilization causes a financial burden on their families. In a telling statistic, "A congressional watchdog agency found (that) 94 percent of mobilized National Guard personnel have had problems with their military pay".²¹ Therefore, a greater number of problems are being faced by those least able to cope with them.

Even without these problems, reservists are having growing concerns about the security of their jobs upon demobilization. Under the law, reservists cannot be fired due to mobilizations. In fact, they are guaranteed the same status, seniority, and rate of pay when they return to work.²² The reality is that this law is difficult to enforce completely. According to the *Boston Globe*, recent deployments are so long that some reservists are losing their jobs.²³ During deployments, corporate restructuring, mergers, and other normal business practices sometimes eliminate jobs that reservists left behind. A recent survey by Goldman Sachs showed that nearly one third of deployed reservists questioned whether, or not their jobs would be waiting for them when they came off active duty; over half of these believed that, as a minimum, there would be a negative effect on pay and promotion.²⁴

America is also asking employers to bear an unusual burden with the current level of reserve mobilizations. One of the most difficult burdens on employers is multiple mobilization of the same people.²⁵ In addition to multiple mobilizations, unplanned extensions on active duty have also effected employers. Small business employers and small local governmental organizations have been affected the most by the extension of their employees on active duty. To put the problem in perspective, about 50% of Reserve Component soldiers work for companies with fewer than 1,000 employees, while 15% work for companies with fewer than 50 employees.²⁶ Those reservists who are entrepreneurs sometimes bear the greatest burden.

The current level of operations has placed a strain on the Army, particularly the Reserves. This strain indicates that there may be an imbalance between what is required of the force and the current capability of the force. One method to address this imbalance would be to lessen

the requirement by reducing the operating tempo for our Armed Forces. Although this option sounds attractive, the reality is that we cannot disengage from our worldwide commitments. Even if we do not take on any additional operational commitments, our current level of activity is projected to remain relatively stable for sometime. For example, the situation in Afghanistan continues to be tenuous as there have been recent signs that Al - Qaeda is reorganizing and conducting more extensive operations in the region. If the United States is going to fulfill its global security commitments reducing operating tempo is not a valid option.

INCREASING CAPABILITY

Therefore, the Army needs to increase its overall capability. Various alternatives to increasing the capability of the force have been proposed recently. These proposals center around two basic approaches: increasing active duty end strength, or restructuring the active and reserve components to increase the forces available for deployment and lessen our reliance on the reserves. Both of these options are currently being explored. In fact, Congress recently authorized a 2,400 soldier increase in end strength for FY 2004 and Secretary Rumsfeld has used emergency powers to allow the Army to temporarily exceed its authorized end strength by 30,000.²⁷ Some organizations, such as the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), have called for a permanent increase in end strength. In a report from the Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA called for an increase of 60,000 soldiers.²⁸

Even if there was agreement that increased end strength would address the requirement-capability imbalance, increasing end strength takes time. The recruiting and training base can only produce a finite number of additional soldiers per year. It is estimated that the Army can only increase end strength by 5,000 to 10,000 soldiers per year.²⁹ Therefore, increasing Active Duty end strength would not be a quick solution. The other problem with this solution is that the Army must act under financial constraints. With increasing deficits and growing non-discretionary spending, there is little hope for a sustained increase in defense dollars. Therefore, money spent on increased end strength would have to come from other existing programs, such as modernization. A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office estimates that two new divisions worth of end strength would cost up to an estimated \$19.4 billion to create.³⁰

In addition, increasing end strength is not a good mechanism to fulfill temporary requirements. Once force structure is added, both political and military leaders feel pressure to utilize the military in order to justify the existing force structure. These same leaders are hesitant to cut these forces once they are no longer required, especially during election years.

Finally, increasing permanent end strength without a commensurate increase in appropriations could leave the army “bloated and ill-prepared” according to the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker.³¹ If, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated publicly, the increased demand on the Army represents only a temporary spike, then it would make more sense to temporarily utilize the Reserve Components to meet this surge in requirements in addition to other measures already being used such as Stop Loss.

The other approach to increasing capability is to restructure the active and reserve components. This approach has support in both the legislature and the administration. Recently, House Majority Leader Roy Blunt (R-Mo) called for a full review of the structure of the U.S. Armed Forces, expressing concern about the frequent use of the reserves.³² The Secretary of Defense has also called for a rebalancing of the force mix to reduce our reliance on the reserve components, especially in high demand fields like civil affairs. He has also directed the services to limit involuntary call-ups within the first 15 days of a crisis.³³

Lessening the Army’s reliance upon the Reserve Components has high level support. Unfortunately, these restructuring efforts could reduce the level of integration between the Reserve and Active Components with two unintended and potentially harmful consequences. First, in some cases, shifting functions from the Reserve to Active components may actually reduce capability. Second, reducing reliance upon the Reserve Component would jeopardize the Total Force Policy and thus diminishing Reserve Component relevance.

The first issue is whether, or not shifting functions from the Reserve to the Active Component will actually increase our capabilities. Certainly, Active Component forces maintain a higher level of readiness and training than do the Reserves; however, they do so at a much greater financial cost. Additionally, in areas such as civil affairs, the Reserves bring unique capabilities to the fight due to their civilian work experience. General Helmly used the civil affairs function as an example. “Why do you want civil affairs in the active component? Their real world (civilian) experience gives them an edge in performing Army tasks. Hands on nation builders, they focus on infrastructure improvements: getting utilities up and running, working with contractors and overseeing the bureaucracy that distributes food, clothing and water to civilians.”³⁴ The *Dallas Morning News* recently reinforced this point, citing operations in Iraq. “There is a subtle irony that in some respects, at this stage of operations in Iraq, (National Guard) units may actually be better-trained and have more experience than active duty units for the scenario that we’ve dropped our military into...There are city cops who’ve put on a uniform and are now taking on the mean streets of Tikrit and Baghdad.”³⁵

The second issue is whether or not it is wise to divest ourselves from the Total Force policy that has worked so well for the last thirty years. The Total Force Policy was developed in response to the country's failure to mobilize the Reserve Components during the Vietnam War. Because we did not mobilize the Reserves, the Active Army had to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of war and became disconnected from the society that sent it to war. By excluding the Reserve Component forces from the current fight, the Army might again return to an environment of distrust between components similar to the one which existed during the Vietnam War. This distrust and lack of relevance would demoralize the Reserve Component and cause lasting damage to Reserve Component readiness. Richard Alexander, head of the National Guard Association of the United States, summed it up when he stated that the "morale of (National Guard) members would erode if soldiers were told they were not primarily focused on war fighting."³⁶

THE MINUTEMAN CONCEPT

To address these drawbacks, I would propose another option, called the MINUTEMEN concept. The MINUTEMEN concept would create a more rapidly deployable, expeditionary Reserve Component force. This campaign capable force would fill a current void in available manpower while enhancing the capability of the Reserve Components. The concept is based on the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) Concept already used by the Active Component. Under this concept, all Reserve Component units would rotate through pre-planned and tiered, alert and readiness levels over a five year period.

Under the MINUTEMEN system, all Reserve Component units would be placed on a five year cycle. The five year cycle would be broken down into year-long phases. The Year One Phase, the Platoon Training Phase, would be the first phase in the five year cycle. It would look very similar to the current Reserve Component training schedule and the focus would be on individual and platoon level training. The units in the Platoon Training Phase would go to monthly drills and annual training with little possibility of being mobilized. The Year Two Phase, the Company Training Phase, would also maintain the current drill routine. The focus of training would shift from platoon to company level training. In addition, units in this phase would be more likely to mobilize than those in the Platoon Training Phase. The Year Three Phase would be a "ramp-up" year. During this phase, the unit would double the amount of drill time through normal weekend drills and one four week annual training event. This accelerated training would culminate in a major battalion, or brigade-level training event at a maneuver training center, or a local training site. Units in this phase would be mobilized ahead of units in the other two

phases. The Year Four Phase would be the Expeditionary Phase. In this phase, units would maintain a high level of training and be prepared to mobilize with a 15 to 30 day notice for up to 18 months. These Expeditionary Phase units would be the first to mobilize in the event of a crisis. The Year Five Phase would be the Reset Phase. The focus in this phase would be on maintenance and individual training and education. Units in the Reset Phase would be the last to deploy in the event of an emergency. See Table One below.

	Year One	Year Two	Year Three	Year Four	Year Five
Platoon Training	x				
Company Training		x			
Ramp-up Phase			x		
Expeditionary Phase				x	
Reset Phase					x

TABLE 1: MINUTEMEN FIVE YEAR CYCLE

Another mechanism for making the MINUTEMEN system more relevant to the force is the adoption by key units of a capability-based mobilization versus the current, event-based mobilization. Rather than waiting for a domestic or international emergency to initiate mobilization, selected Reserve forces would be mobilized based on a projected shortfall in active duty capability. Additionally, they would be mobilized based on their position in the tiered readiness cycle. Under this capabilities-based mobilization schedule, select MINUTE MEN units would be mobilized for 18 month periods with an option to expand the active duty time period to two years during a national emergency. Conversely, as the required capability decreased, mobilization could be reduced to six months, or skipped altogether.

In order to meet the current requirements for the nation building in Iraq, the Army may need an additional 15,000 troops for the next 5 to 10 years. Under the MINUTEMEN system, the Army would mobilize forces tailored to meet these required capabilities, rather than permanently increasing active duty end strength. Using only the existing 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs), the MINUTEMAN system could add approximately 15,000 combat soldiers to the available force per year by mobilizing those brigades in the expeditionary phase. Using only five of the 15 ESBs, Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate how the cycle would work. This cycle would be the same for the other ESBs. The mobilized ESBs are designated as National Deployable Brigades (NDB). Those forces not mobilized are designated as National Ready Brigades (NRBs) and are numbered sequentially based on their sequence of mobilization in the event of a national emergency. Units coming off of status as National Deployable Brigades

would move to the Reset phase and a National Ready Brigade status of 4, meaning they would be the last unit to deploy in an emergency.

Unit Status	Unit number	Expeditionary	Ramp-up	Company	Platoon	Reset	Active
NDB 1	1	x					15,000
NRB 1	2		x				
NRB 2	3			x			
NRB 3	4				x		
NRB 4	5					x	
							15,000

TABLE 2: YEAR ONE OF CYCLE

Unit Status	Unit number	Expeditionary	Ramp-up	Company	Platoon	Reset	Active
NRB 4	1		►			x	
NDB 1	2	x					15,000
NRB 1	3		x				
NRB 2	4			x			
NRB 3	5				x		
							15,000

TABLE 3: YEAR TWO OF CYCLE

The MINUTEMEN system would also have the capability to rapidly increase the size of the mobilized forces. Using only the Enhanced Separate Brigades, the Army would have the capacity to rapidly increase this force to almost 30,000 during times of crisis, by mobilizing the units in the Ramp-up phase (see Table 4). The Ramp-up Units, previously designated as National Ready Brigades (NRB), would then be designated as NDBs. These units would have to undergo their annual training and deployment processing prior to mobilization; however, this process would occur more quickly due to their greater level of readiness,. The units which were lower on the tiered readiness cycle, listed as National Ready Brigades, would then undergo a compression of training and readiness phases to provide greater depth in any future rotation cycles. These units could also be mobilized, although they would require a longer lead time than the Expeditionary, or Ramp-up units. Units in the Reset Phase would not change their disposition, or readiness levels unless absolutely necessary. However, in the event of a major war, all units could be mobilized. Of course, they would do so at varying mobilization timelines, with lower numbered NRBs being activated first.

		Expeditionary	Ramp-up	Company	Platoon	Reset	Active
NDB 1	1	x					15,000
NDB 2	2	x					15,000
NDB 1	3		x				
NDB 2	4		x				
NRB 3	5					x	
							30,000

TABLE 4: RAMP UP CAPABILITY

The MINUTEMEN concept would also support other transformational initiatives such as Global Basing. The Global Basing initiative would replace permanently stationed OCONUS active duty force structure with a rotational pool of active units. Using the MINUTEMAN system, we could mobilize and deploy three National Deployable Brigades (NDB) per year. Using only the existing National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigade (ESB) force structure and designating them as NDBs, the Army could establish a sustainable, five year rotational cycle between deployments OCONUS. Each year one National Guard ESB would be mobilized and deployed to each of the forward bases in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Republic of Korea. These units would replace Active Component units currently in theater. In the event of a lesser contingency operation, MINUTEMEN forces would be forward deployed and available for redeployment into the corresponding theater. This option would maintain our current forward presence levels, while freeing up Active Component forces for other missions. Also, by integrating the MINUTE MEN units into the Global Basing Initiative, the Army would be able to reduce the number of family members currently in these countries, as well as the infrastructure requirements and corresponding overseas basing costs.

The utility of the MINUTEMAN system could be maximized by applying it to other elements of the Reserve Components such as high demand units like military police and civil affairs. By converting existing force structure to these low density, high demand specialties, the Army Reserve could establish a rotational system for battalion and smaller sized, critical units. These units would be placed on the same five year cycle as the ESBs. Through this restructuring, the proposed MINUTEMAN system would satisfy Lieutenant General Helmly's intent of a 10 to 1 ratio of capability to need so that a soldier deploys only once in five years.³⁷

The success of the MINUTEMEN system is tied to gaining support from the Congress. Some elements of Congress are skeptical about the current growing reliance upon the reserves. Senator James Inhofe, the Republican Senator from Oklahoma, recently stated that current operating tempo was causing the Army to overwork the Guard and Reserve.³⁸ Senator Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nebraska, recently stated that the Reserves "need a definite period of

time they can be obligated to go overseas and how many times they have to go overseas.³⁹ The MINUTEMEN system addresses both of these concerns by adding predictability to the mobilization and deployment process.

Another prerequisite for the MINUTEMEN system to be successful is to address the Homeland Defense requirements. As AUSA pointed out in a recent Defense Report, "One can imagine the reluctance of a state governor to see his or her state's (Army National Guard) troops placed under federal control and deployed 5,000 miles away when terrorists attacks here in the United States are a real possibility."⁴⁰ As of April 2002, 28,000 Reserve Component soldiers had been called to active duty in support of homeland defense missions. A portion of the Total Force must be earmarked for this mission. Again, the MINUTEMEN system could actually improve our capability to respond to homeland defense requirements, as well as natural disasters. Selected National Guard and Reserve Component units could be placed on a five year cycle with training tailored for typical homeland defense and disaster response missions. These units could then respond wherever an emergency might occur within the United States, under a system of interstate assistance agreements. Many states, such as California and New York, already have these interstate agreements in place.

Even though the Reserves have a long history of responding to domestic and natural disasters, skeptics would question the ability of the Reserve Components to maintain the readiness required under the MINUTEMEN system. There have been problems in the past. For example, the 48th Infantry Brigade from Georgia was unable to deploy in support of Desert Storm due to readiness concerns brought to light during its rotation to the National Training Center. Additionally, Guard units had routinely exaggerated troop availability and readiness. The Reserves have made significant improvements in readiness over the past twelve years. The Army Reserve appears to have already resolved the readiness issue. Some 70,000 USAR soldiers made their Latest Arrival Date for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.⁴¹ There is no reason to believe that this improvement in readiness will not continue given the ongoing command emphasis and the provision of sufficient resources.

As stated above, the MINUTEMEN system addresses the primary concerns of Congress and the requirements of Homeland Defense. By keeping the Reserve components in the fight and addressing the issues of predictability and readiness, the MINUTEMEN system could be used to fulfill the short term capability shortfalls in a cost-effective and innovative manner. In order to make the MINUTEMEN force a reality, the Army would have to address key force development issues. Additionally, the MINUTEMEN system will require significant changes in

Reserve Component Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities to make the system work.

IMPLEMENTING THE MINUTEMAN CONCEPT

Mobilization doctrine is the first area where changes will have to be made. The rationale for our current mobilization concept was well expressed in a recent AUSA Defense Report . “During the Cold War, the reserve components trained to mobilize over a long period of time... this linear, sequential process emphasized mass over time and achieved wartime preparedness after mobilization.”⁴² The Reserve Components must adapt to a more flexible mobilization process to meet the requirements of the current Global War on Terrorism. The adjustments outlined in the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative go a long way towards fulfilling this requirement. This initiative stated that the Army must switch from an Alert, Mobilize, Train, and Deploy methodology to a Train, Alert, Mobilize, and Deploy methodology. For this method to be effective, the pre-mobilization training process must be rigorous enough to ensure that units are ready to accomplish their mission prior to mobilization.

There are also some obvious organizational changes that would facilitate the Train, Alert, Mobilize, and Deploy methodology. All early deploying units such as the Enhanced Separate Brigades should be organized under an Integrated Division structure. These Integrated Divisions would then be responsible for training and readiness certification of the ESBs prior to mobilization. In order to meet this requirement, these divisions could be organized with 5 ESBs each, thereby controlling an entire rotation cycle responsibility. This structure would also align these forces with the 5 brigade unit of actions currently being explored for use in the Active Component division structure. Based on the current structure of 15 ESBs, this would require establishing one additional Integrated division headquarters. Later deploying units could be integrated into the current force structure such as the standing National Guard Divisions.

In addition to the establishment of Integrated Divisions, the Army must also restructure the force to create rotational depth in the high demand, low density units. Under the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative, the reserves are already in the process of restructuring to provide more military police, civil affairs, and other high demand units.⁴³ For example, the National Guard is already creating depth in the bench by converting over 5,000 artillery soldiers into military police.⁴⁴ By creating this additional depth, the Army can reduce the number of involuntary call-ups. In order to gain an expeditionary capability similar to the ESBs, the Reserves may want to establish modular capability packages, such as the stabilization units being proposed by Retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski.⁴⁵

The Reserve Components must also change the way they train if the MINUTEMEN system is to be successful. Traditionally, Reservists have trained for about 39 days per year. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs recently stated, Reservists will require a more flexible drilling schedule, including virtual drilling in the future.⁴⁶ During the ramp-up and expeditionary phases of the MINUTEMEN cycle, Reservists may require 60 to 80 training days per year to meet the more rigorous training requirements of an expeditionary force (see Table 5). In addition to increasing training time and flexibility, the Army may also want to narrow the breadth of missions for which each reserve unit trains. Currently, many Reserve components are required to train for missions they will never execute. By narrowing the mission essential task list (METL) to most probable tasks, precious collective training time could be devoted to more frequently required, critical tasks and provide the Joint Force Commander a more relevant and ready force.

RAMP-UP	EXPEDITIONARY			RESET
60-80 days incl. Annual Training	Train/Alert/Deploy (3 months)	Employment (12 months)	Demobilize (2-3 months)	Individual/Virtual Training/Education

TABLE 5: TRAINING FOCUS

The Army must also eliminate the duplication of having both Active and Reserve units validating training and personnel readiness of reserve soldiers, in order to get the maximum responsiveness from our MINUTEMAN force. General Helmly is currently proposing that the Army accept the Reserve's annual soldier readiness processing rather than have soldiers repeat the process when deploying. This is a step in the right direction. The recent restructuring of Regional Support Commands to Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) is another step in the right direction. These RRCs enhance the Army Reserve' capability to train, monitor, and mobilize reserve forces by shifting administrative responsibilities to the installations.

In addition to changes in training and readiness responsibilities, the Army must also increase the percentage of active soldiers in the Guard and Reserves in order to increase readiness. These full time support personnel are critical to the readiness of Guard and Reserve units. As Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, pointed out in a recent AUSA Landpower Essay, "under current guidelines it can take several weeks to months to prepare an Army National Guard unit to mobilize and deploy – compared to the Air Guard model, where units deploy in a matter of hours, or days."⁴⁷ The primary difference between

these two models is the number of full time support personnel. The Air National Guard is manned with 33.67% full-time personnel.⁴⁸ The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are manned at 11.3% and 6.8% respectively (see Figure 1). According to the most recent National Guard Bureau Posture Statement, the Army has developed an “incremental ramping method” for achieving Reserve Component full-time strength levels. However, they will not get there until 2012.⁴⁹ The Army Reserve Components would need a more rapid increase in the number of full time support personnel to meet the increased readiness requirements of the MINUTEMEN system.




FIGURE 1: FULL TIME MANNING COMPARISON⁵⁰

The MINUTEMAN system would also have to utilize a personnel policy that provided minimal turnover for units going into the Ramp-up and Expeditionary Phases. The unit manning system being adopted by the active component has only minimal application in the reserves. The reserves would have to address this turnover through enlistment and reenlistment incentives synchronized with the operational readiness cycles. Recruiting efforts would have to increase during the Company training phase to ensure that the unit was set prior to entering the Ramp-up Phase. Additionally, reenlistments options would have to stabilize career soldiers through the Expeditionary phase, or transfer them to other, lower priority units.

The MINUTEMAN system would also require a self mobilization capability in the reserves. Increasing full time strength would address the personnel requirements for self mobilization; however, there would have to be a corresponding improvement in facilities. According to the

most recent Army National Guard Posture statement, it would cost approximately \$1.5 billion to bring ARNG facilities up to DoD standards. Therefore, significant resources would have to be devoted to improving facilities.

In summary, the MINUTEMEN concept has numerous benefits. First, the MINUTEMEN concept would increase capability at a reduced cost. Second, the capability-based mobilization schedule would address the predictability issues for Reserve Component members, their families, and their employers. In addition, rather than transferring functions to the Active Component, the MINUTEMEN concept would allow the Army to benefit from the unique experience the reserves bring to the table due to their civilian employment skills. It also would maintain the spirit of the Total Force concept by keeping the reserves, and thus the nation, involved in military operations abroad. By doing so, we would keep the reserves involved and maintain their morale as essential members of the team. The MINUTEMAN fully complements the restructuring efforts underway by the Department of Defense. Finally, the capability provided by the MINUTEMEN concept would help transform the reserves into a ready, versatile, and relevant component of our expeditionary Army. When the nation calls again, the modern-day MINUTEMEN will be ready to respond.

WORD COUNT= 5,999

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